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SEVERABILITY OF COVENANTS IN PARTIAL
RESTRAINT OF TRADE: A NEW RULE
CONTRACTS IN RESTRINT OF TRADE have long met with judicial re-
sistance from both American and English courts. That unlimited cove-
nants not to compete are void as against public policy is a proposition
unanimously supported by decisional as well as statutory law." Absent
a statute directing otherwise, however, limited covenants in partial re-
straint of trade will unquestionably be enforced if the restraint imposed
is reasonable2 as to the extent of space and length of time covered by the
' Virtually every case dealing with a contract in restraint of trade has announced
this rule. Oregon Steam Navigation Co. v. Winsor, 87 U.S. (zo Wall.) 64 (1874);
3 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 934 a (5th ed. 194.1); GA. COIE ANN. § Zo-
504 (1933). For excellent historical discussions of noncompetition agreements, see
Carpenter, Validity of Contracts Not to Compete, 76 U. PA. L. REv. 244 (928);
Kales, Contracts to Refrain from Doing Business or from Entering or Carrying on an
Occupation, 31 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1917) i Farwell, Covenants in Restraint of Trade,
44. L.Q. REV. 66 (1928) (summarizing developments in English law). For an exten-
sive list of authorities covering all phases of this question, see Arthur Murray Dance
Studios v. Witter, io5 N.E.2d 6S 5 (Ohio 1952).
2 The main question in these cases is whether the noncompetition covenant is rea-
sonably necessary to protect the plaintiff. Thomas W. Briggs Co. v. Mason, 217 Ky.
269, 289 S.W. 295 (1926), cited in the principal case, held that four factors must be
considered to determine reasonableness: (I) the reasonable protection of the employer,
(z) the not unreasonable restraint of the employee, (3) the business of the employer,
and (4) the territorial extent of the employer's business. In Milwaukee Linen Snpply
Co. v. Ring, 21o Wis. 467, 246 N.W. 567- (1933), the court announced a three way
test in which the interests of the business, of the party restrained, and of the public are
determinative, citing the RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 513-15 (932). See also,
May v. Young, 125 Conn. 1, 2 A.2d 385 (1938); Mattis v. Lally, 138 Conn. 5i,
82 A.2d 155 (295i); Swanson v. Kirby, 98 Ga. 586, 26 S.E. 71 (1896); Pinson v.
Moffat, 2o9 Ga. 7, 70 S.E.2d 359 (1952), noted in 27 TUL. L. REV. 364 (953) ;
Pelc v. Kulentis, 257 Ill. App. 213 (930); Foltz v. Struxness, 168 Kan. 724, 215
P.zd 133 (i95o); Granger v. Craven, 259 Minn. 296, i99 N.W. 10 (2924); New
England Tree Expert Co. v. Russell, 3o6 Mass. 504, 28 N.E.zd 997 (i94o), noted in
26 CoRNELL. L.Q. 707 (194); Trenton Potteries Co. v. Oliphant, 58 N.J.Eq. 507, 43
At. 723 (t899) ; Mandeville v. Harman, 42 N.J.Eq. 185, 7 Ad. 37 (1886) ; Diamond
Match Co. v. Roeber, io6 N.Y. 473, i3 N.E. 429 (1887); Moskin Bros. v. Swartzberg,
i99 N. C. 539, 155 S.E. 154 (1930), cited by the court of appeals in the principal case;
Holland v. Brown, 304. Pa. 545, 156 Ad. i68 (1932) ; Herneshoff v. Boutineau, 17
R.I. 3, i9 Atl. 712 (i89o); Bettinger v. North Fort Worth Ice Co., 278 S.W. 466
(Tex.Civ.App. 1925); Cali v. National Linen Service, 38 F.2d 35 (sth Cir. 1930).
English cases accord with these American doctrines. The leading case is Mitchel v.
Reynolds, i P. Wins. ii, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (K.B. 171). See also, Nordenfelt v.
Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co., [1894] A.C. 535; Dubowski & Sons v.
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terms of the covenant.3 If a contract in partial restraint of trade fails to
satisfy these requirements of reasonableness, the great preponderance
of English and American courts will, to a greater or less degree, attempt
to sever its terms4 and, thereafter, to enforce those portions which are
reasonable.5
Goldstein [1896] 1 Q.B. 478; Mason v. Provident Clothing and Supply Co. [1913]
A.C. 724.
'Victor Chemical Works v. Iliff, 299 Ill. 532, 13z N.E. 8o6 (92) (a contract
unlimited as to time and space is void, absent proof that employee was aware of trade
secrets) ; Wiley v. Baumgardner, 97 Ind. 66 (884) (a contract for the sale of a busi-
ness in which the noncompetition covenant contained a five-year time limit and was
unlimited in territory, held void); Diamond Match Co., v. Roeber, 1o6 N.Y. 473, 13
N.E. 419 (1887) (a covenant not to compete in all of the United States and the terri-
tories except Nevada and Montana for ninety-nine years held reasonable). A contract
unlimited in space but limited as to time will be enforced if reasonable. Elbe File &
Binder Co. v. Fine, 137 Misc. 255, 24z N.Y.Supp. 632 (Sup.Ct. 1930). If there is
no time limit expressed, the time is assumed to be for the lifetime of the person in whose
favor it runs. Hauser v. Harding, 1z6 N.C. 295, 35 S.E. 586 (9oo). Bitt cf., Hall
Mfg. Co. v. Western Steel & Iron Works, 227 Fed. 588 ( 7th Cir. x915), in which it
was held that a restrictive covenant is not necessarily invalid if unlimited as to time
and space, since public policy and honest business judgment must be balanced against
each other.
The English cases similarly require reasonable limitations as to time and space.
Ward v. Byrne, 5 M.&W. 548, 151 Eng. Rep. 232 (Ex. 1839); Bromley v. Smith,
[i909] 2 K.B. 2355 Morris v. Saxelby, [1916] 1 A.C. 688. In Stephens v. Kuhnelle
(New South Wales 1926) 26 S.R. 327, noted in 26 COLUas. L. REv. 1o41 (1926), a
covenant not to solicit plaintiff's customers for one year and within a radius of five
miles was held unreasonable because it included more than the customers actually served
by defendant while in plaintiff's employ. Gilford Motor Co. v. Home, [1933] CI.
935. But cf., Rousillon v. Rousillon, L.R. 14 Ch. Div. 351 (i88o) (limited territory
is unnecessary if the contract is reasonable).
'The prevailing rule declares that a contract is to be judged as an entirety only if
its terms cannot be severed. Beit v. Beit, 135 Conn. 195, 63 A.2d 161 (948) , Con-
sumers Oil Co. v. Nunnemaker, 142 Ind. 560, 41 N.E. 1048 (1895), Dole Refrigerating
Co. v. Kold, 185 F.zd 809 (6th Cir. 195o)5 Interstate Finance Corp. v. Wood, 69
F. Supp. 278 (E.D. Ill. x946) 5 Wisconsin Ice & Coal Co. v. Lueth, 213 Wis. 42, z50
N.W. 8i (1933). The doctrine of severability is discussed in 5 U. NEWARE L. REV.
124 (1940). See also, 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1659 (rev. ed. 1937). The severa-
bility rule is supported by the RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 5x8 (1932).
'In John T. Stanley Co. v. Lagonarsino, 53 F.zd 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1931), cited by
the court in the principal case as not militating against its renunciation of the severance
doctrine, a covenant not to engage in a business involving the sale of fats, grease, bone,
and soap was held divisible, and void only as to soap. In Edwards v. Mildlin, 22o Cal.
379, 30 P.zd 997 (1934), noted in 82 U. PA. L. REV. 872 (1934)
, 
a partnership
agreement provided that on dissolution each partner would do business only in one-half
of the state for a period of twenty-five years. The contract was severed, and the limi-
tation held valid to the extent of Los Angeles County, although a state statue voided
contracts in restraint of trade. See also, Hood v. Legg, 16o Ga. 62o, iz8 S.E. 891
(Vol. 5: 1 I
A recent holding by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit stands as a remarkable departure from this Anglo-Ameri-
can precedent of severance. Welcome Wagon v. Morris6 involved an
employment contract in which defendant-employee covenanted not to
engage in a business similar to that of plaintiff-employer for a period of
five years after leaving the latter's employment. This noncompetition
agreement covered the territory of (i) Gastonia, North Carolina, and/or
(2) any other place in the United States or Canada in which plaintiff-
employer is then engaged in rendering his services, and/or (3) any other
place in the United States or Canada in which plaintiff-employer has
been or has signified his intention to be engaged in rendering his
services. 7
On plaintiff's appeal from an adverse judgment in the district court,8
the restrictive covenant was held unreasonable as to length of time and
extent of space, and, therefore, void and unenforceable. In answer to
(1925) (a covenant restraining defendant from selling brick or other clay products
was severed and held enforceable only as to the sale of brick) 5 General Bronze Corp.
v. Schmeling, zo8 Wis. 42, 243 N.W. 469 (1932), noted in 17 MINN. L. REV. 86
(1932) (a covenant encompassing all of the United States, Canada and Mexico, except
Nevada, held valid only as to the United States) 5 Pelc v. Kulentis, 257 Ill. App. 213
(930) ; Bennett v. Carmichael Produce Co., 64 Ind.App. 341, 115 N.E. 793 (917);
Davey Tree Expert Co. v. Ackelbein, 233 Ky. 115, 25 S.W.2d 6z (1930); Sherman v.
Pfefferkorn, z41 Mass. 468, 135 N.E. 568 (1922)5 Fort Smith Light & Traction Co.
v. Kelley, 94 Ark. 461, 127 S.W. 975 (igo) 5 Peltz v. Eichele, 62 Mo. 171 (876);
Central N.Y. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Averill, 199 N.Y. 128, 9 z N.E. zo6 (i9o) ; Smith's
Appeal, 113 Pa. 579, 6 At. 251 (1886); John Roane, Inc. v. Tweed, 89 A.zd 548
(Del. 1952).
The English cases, similarly, follow the severability rule. The leading English case
is Price v. Green, x6 M.&W. 346, 153 Eng. Rep. 2z22 (Ex. 1847) in which a covenant
not to compete in London and Westminster or six hundred miles therefrom was enforced
only as to London and Westminster. See also, Rogers v. Maddocks, [1892] 3 Ch. 346,
(a covenant not to sell aerated waters or malt liquors within one hundred miles of
Cardiff, held enforceable as to malt liquors only)5 Dubowski & Sons v. Goldstein,
[1896] i Q.B. 478, (a covenant never to interfere with P's customers held severable
and enforceable only as to customers P had while D was in his employ) ; Pickering v.
Ilfracombe Ry. Co., L.R. 3 C.P. 235, 250 (1868), discussed in 13 N.Z.L.J. "2o5, 221,
24. (-937).
a 224 F.2d 693 (4 th Cir. 1955). Judge Dobie delivered the opinion for a unani-
mous court.
'This is a paraphrase of the actual covenants, but each was, in fact, enumerated in
the manner set forth.
a z29 F.Supp. i (W.D.N.C. 1955). The district court held that defendant's newly
acquired employment was not similar to the plaintiff's business. The court of appeals
held that this finding was error, but affirmed on the ground that the contract was void
for unreasonableness.
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plaintiff's contention that the specifically enumerated provisions were
separable and should be enforced as to the first provision only, the court
of appeals replied that "the restrictive covenant must be judged as a
whole and must stand or fall when so judged."9
In this case, the Fourth Circuit was interpreting and applying the
law of North Carolina; and, in announcing its decision, the court de-
dared that it could find nothing in the law of that state which militated
against the position it had taken. Oddly enough, however, in one of
the cases cited in the course of the opinion, the North Carolina Supreme
Court severed the ufireasonable covenants of a contract in partial re-
straint of trade, even though such severance necessitated an actual
rewriting of the contract terms.'" Nevertheless, the fact that the Wel-
come Wagon decision has been handed down by a United States court
of appeals makes it particularly notable-representing, perhaps, a calcu-
lated innovation by a small, yet relatively significant, minority. If, in
fact, the decision in the principal case marks the incipience of a new
minority rule, then the various Anglo-American jurisdictions are now
divided into four distinct groups on the question of severability.
First, the approach adopted by a majority of courts is to read out
of the contract those unreasonable clauses which are, by their very terms,
separable.' This judicial technique is frequently designated the "blue
224 F.zd at 701.
"In Hauser v. Harding, 1z6 N.C. 295, 35 S.E. 586 (90), defendant covenanted
not to practice medicine in "the territory surrounding Yadkinville." The court held
that the terms of the covenant were too indefinite, and the restraint would be rewritten
to include only the corporate limits of Yadkinville. The North Carolina rule, there-
fore, would seem to be that a contract in partial restraint of trade can be severed and
partially enforced.
In Noe v. McDevitt, 228 N.C. 242, 45 S.E.zd 1z (1947), plaintiff, owner of a
barber supply company, employed defendant as a salesman. Defendant covenanted that,
on leaving plaintiff's employ, he would not engage in a similar business in North or
South Carolina for five years. In a subsequent suit against the defendant, the North
Carolina Supreme Court held the covenant void as unreasonably extensive. Certain
language in the opinion resembles that of Judge Dobie in the principal case: "The
Court cannot by splitting up the territory make a new contract for the parties-it must
stand or fall integrally." z28 N.C. at 245, 45 S.E.zd at 123. It is strange that the
court of appeals does not refer to that language in rejecting the severance rule, but
rather cites Hauser v. Harding, supra, as a case that does not "militate against" the
position taken. 224 F.2d at 701. The court did, however, cite Noe v. McDevitt for
two propositions: (i) the territory in the covenant must be reasonably necessary to
protect the employer's business, and (2) an unreasonable restraint must not be imposed
on the employee. 224 F.zd at 699.
"' See cases cited note 5 supra.
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pencil rule," since the test announced by the courts in determining sepa-
rability is whether a blue pencil can be drawn through the unreasonable
covenants, leaving the valid ones to stand independently."2
An increasing number of other states have gone t6 further lengths,
and, rather than invalidate an unreasonable and indivisible contract, have
assumed the burden of interpolating divisibility into the text of the
covenants. 13  In these jurisdictions, contracts in partial restraint of trade
can be drafted in the most comprehensive terms, with the confidence that
the court will rewrite the covenants to give the plaintiff-employer the
broadest protection allowed by law.
14
' The American cases cited in note 5 supra, illustrate various applications of the
"blue pencil rule." There is still some doubt as to the applicability of this rule in
England. In Goldsoll v. Goldman, [x914] 2 Ch. 603, a contract for the sale of a
business included a covenant that the seller not compete for two years in the United
Kingdom, the Isle of Man, France, the United States, Russia, Spain, Vienna or within
twenty-five miles of Potsdamerstrasse. This single covenant was severed and held valid
to the extent of the United Kingdom. Six years later in Attwood v. Lamont, [1920]
2 K.B. x46, an employment contract containing a covenant not to engage in the business
of a tailor, designer, etc., was severed and held valid as to the occupation of tailor only.
In [1920] 3 K.B. 571 , this decision was reversed, the court rejecting the "blue pencil
rule." They held that covenants are severable only when distinct; parts of a single
covenant will not be severed.
Ronbar Enterprises, Ltd. v. Green, [1954.] 2 All E.R. 266 (C.A.) is the most recent
English case on this question. The Goldsoll and Attwood decisions supra, were distin-
guished by the peculiar facts of each; and, having made this distinction, the court re-
verted to the "blue pencil rule" of the Goldsoll case in upholding a noncompetition
covenant in a contract for the sale of a business. But even. under the more conservative
Attwood rule requiring a number of distinct covenants, the Welcome Wagon covenants
could be severed.
"s The New Jersey or Massachusetts rule has emerged from several decisions holding
that an inseparable covenant will be construed as divisible, if such is the presumed in-
tention of the parties. In Fleckenstein Bros. v. Fleckenstein, 76 N.J.L. 613, 71 Atl. z65
(i9o8), the parties contracted not to compete in the bologna business for twenty years
within five hundred miles of Jersey City, New Jersey. The court held the contract
divisible by construing it to read "either in Jersey City or within five hundred miles
from that city." In Trenton Potteries Co. v. Oliphant, 58 N.J.Eq. 507, 43 Atl. 723
(1899), defendant covenanted against competing "within any state in the United States."
A divisible contract was created by construing the terms to read "within Alabama, within
Arizona . .. etc."
1, In the more liberal jurisdictions it is not necessary to hold the contract severable,
since the courts will simply create their own reasonable contracts. See General Paint
Corp. v. Seymour, 124 Cal. App. 6xi, 12 P.2d 990 (1932) (a covenant not to compete
for five years in the State of California held valid as to Los Angeles) 5 Foltz v. Struxness,
168 Kan. 71, 2i5 P.zd 133 (1950) (a covenant "within the city of Hutchinson or
within one hundred miles" was held valid as to the city and a five mile radius there-
from); Ceresia v. Mitchell, 242 S.W.±d 359 (Ky. 1951), noted in 32 B.U.L. REV.
224 (1952) (a covenant not to engage in any business whatsoever in the same county
NOTESx956]
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In contrast to this trend in the courts, a few states, in recent years,
have passed statutes declaring void and unenforceable all contracts in
partial restraint of trade, with some narrowly defined exceptions."
And, finally, under the rule of the Welcome Wagon case, courts
would enforce only those noncompetition agreements which are reason-
for an unlimited time, held valid as to a competing business for a term of ten years-
the term of plaintiff's lease); Edgecomb v. Edmonston, 257 Mass. 12, 153 N.E. 99
(1926) (covenant not to engage in a similar business in Massachusetts for a period of
five years held a valid restraint from competing in Boston and from soliciting customers
in Massachusetts) ; Herrington v. Hackler, 18S Okla. 396, 74 P.zd 388 (1937) (one
hundred mile radius cut down to confines of one county); Hartman v. Everett, 158
Okla. 29, 12 P.2d 543 (1932) (area including all of the United States reduced to one
county) ; Eldridge v. Johnston, 195 Ore. 379, 245 P.2d 239 (1952), noted in 32 ORE.
L. REV. z6o (1953) (a covenant covering all of Oregon and Washington, held valid
as to four Oregon counties) ; Hill v. Central West Public Service Co., 37 F.zd 451 (sth
Cir. 1930) (a covenant encompassing all of Texas, held valid as to city of Dallas) ;
John T. Stanley Co. v. Lagomarsino, 53 F.2d iz2 (S.D.N.Y. 1931) (New York and
New Jersey reduced to the area where plaintiff does business); Whiting Milk Com-
panies v. O'Connell, 277 Mass. 570, 179 N.E. 169 (i93i), noted in 45 HARV. L. REV.
751 (1932), x2 B.U.L. REV. 273 (1932); Metropolitan Ice Co. v. Ducas, 291 Mass.
403, x96 N.E. 856 (1935); Burroughs Adding Machine Co. v. Chollar, 79 S.W.2d
344 (Tex.Civ.App. 1935)5 Pancake Realty Co. v. Harber, 137 W.Va. 605, 73 S.E.2d
438 (1952); Note, i BUFFALO L. REV. 181 (i95i). Professor Corbin urges the
rejection of the "blue pencil" rule in favor of the New Jersey rule. 6 CovnIN, CoN-
TrACS § 1390 (i95).
" CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 166oo (Deering, 1941 ) provides that all contracts in
restraint of trade are void unless they fall within exceptions such as partnership agree-
ments or the sale of business goodwill. Under this statute, the courts have severed
covenants, upholding the ones that fall within an exception. Neverthless, an employee
cannot be restrained from competing with his employer. Morris v. Harris, 127 Cal.
App.2d 476, 274 P.2d 22 0954).
LA. REV. STAT. § 23:921 (1950): "No employer shall require or direct any em-
ployee to enter into any contract whereby the employee agrees not to engage in any
competing business . . . upon the termination of his contract of employment with such
employer, and all such contracts, or provisions thereof . . . shall be null and unen-
forceable in any court."
MICH. Comp. LAws §§445.761, 445.766 (1948), declares that all contracts not
to engage in any "avocation, . . . profession, . . . whether reasonable or unreasonable,
partial or general, limited or unlimited, are hereby declared to be against public policy
and illegal and void." There are certain narrow exceptions: covenants protecting the
vendee in the sale of a business, and covenants in employment contracts prohibiting the
covenantor from soliciting the covenantee's customers for ninety days after the termina-
tion of the employment contract.
The Oklahoma statute, OKLA. STATS. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 217-219 (1937), is modeled
after the California statute, supra. In E. S. Miller Laboratories, Inc. V. Griffin, 200
Okla. 398, 194 P.2d 877 (i948), a noncompetition covenant in an employment con-
tract was held not to fall within a statutory exception, the court citing the California
statute, supra, and Morris v. Harris, supra.
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able as an entirety. This new position was certainly not taken by the
Fourth Circuit in response to general adverse criticism of the "blue pen-
cil rule." Quite the contrary, most arguments addressed to the problem
seek to justify the rule of severability, in either its conservative or more
liberal form. The requirement of severance imposes no intolerable
burden on the courts and, as a matter of simple contract law, such a rule
probably better effectuates the "intent of the parties." Therefore, it is
argued, since reasonable contracts in restraint of trade are enforceable,
there is nothing which should prohibit the courts from eliminating the
unreasonable terms and giving effect to the balance.'
This argument, however, overlooks certain very undesirable collateral
effects of severance. Once having agreed not to compete for a prescribed
period, a covenantor who has terminated his employment will, more
likely than not, strictly adhere to the broadest terms of his contract.
This adherence will be prompted, in part, by the financial inability of the
covenantor to litigate his rights,'17 and, in part, by a commendable respect
for what appears to be a legal obligation.' Consequently, the practical
10 [T]he judicially made (or modified) contract approximates the one made by the
parties and is certainly more satisfactory to one whose protection is in question than
entire loss of protection would be, and the other party ought not to object to a lawful
restraint which is less than he agreed upon voluntarily and for which he has been paid."
Breckenridge, Restraint of Trade in North Carolina, 7 N.C.L. REV. 249, 258 (1929).
Similar arguments abound in the cases and articles which favor the doctrine of severance
and the New Jersey rule.
1, That the threat of litigation acts as a deterrent to the breach of an unreasonable
covenant is an argument formulated in a dictum by Lord Moulton in Mason v. Provi-
dent Clothing & Supply Co., [19I] A.C. 724, 745. "It would in my opinion be
pessimi exempli if, when an employer had exacted a covenant deliberately framed in
unreasonably wide terms, the courts were to come to his assistance and . . . carve out of
this void covenant the maximum of what he might validly have required. It must be
remembered that the real sanction at the back of these covenants is the terror and ex-
pense of litigation, in which the servant is usually at a great disadvantage, in view of
the longer purse of his master. . . . [T]he hardships imposed by the exaction of un-
reasonable covenants by employers would be greatly increased if they could continue
the practice with the expectation that, having exposed the servant to the anxiety and
expense of litigation, the Court would in the end enable them to obtain everything
which they could have obtained by acting reasonably."
1 Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 75, (932) points out that the employee's belief that
the contract is valid can lead to undesirable results. This criticism was particularly
aimed at the liberal holding in Whiting Milk Companies v. O'Connell, 277 Mass. 570,
x79 N.E. 169 (931). The Massachusetts rule, as first promulgated in Edgecomnb V.
Edmonston, 257 Mass. 12, 153 N.E. 99 (1926), is severely criticized in Note, 4o HARV.
L. REV. 326 (1926), where the writer calls for an abolition of the doctrine, because
it effectuates a contract secured by an employer who holds the balance of bargaining
power in negotiations with an individual employee.
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effect of a severability rule is to allow an employer to restrain trade
under the pretext of an enforceable contract and, at the same time, to
run no greater risk than that of having his contract pared down to what
public policy will actually countenance.
The courts have determined that an employer who has trained an
employee in a special capacity should be allowed to enter into agreements
reasonably-necessary to protect his business interests. To this extent the
law accords the employer a special privilege-a dispensation from the
general rule that no one will be allowed to deprive the business com-
munity of an individuaPs services. In return, therefore, the employer
should bear the correlative burden of drafting his noncompetition con-
tracts narrowly, so as not unnecessarily to deprive society of the eco-
nomic services of an employee.
In sum, it appears that the courts in those jurisdictions which have
adopted the doctrine of severability are encouraging the employer to
take an unfair advantage of an unusual privilege. The rule of the Wel-
come Wagon case would act as a powerful deterrent to such abuses.
While it is perhaps regrettable that the court did not expound this novel
doctrine with greater particularity in its opinion, the rule, in light of
the foregoing considerations, appears to be quite justifiable.
WINSLOW DRUMMOND
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